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Persistent underperformance of public policy and program
implementation in Aboriginal affairs is widely recognised.
We analysed the results of two case studies of attempted
reforms in public administration of Aboriginal primary
health care in the Northern Territory, using a framework
based on the institutionalist and systemic racism litera-
tures, with the aim of better understanding the sources
of implementation failure. Implementation of the agreed
reforms was unsuccessful. Contributing factors were
as follows: strong recognition of the need for change
was not sustained; the seeds of change, present in the
form of alternative practices, were not built on; there
was a notable absence of sustained political/bureaucratic
authorisation; and, interacting with all of these, systemic
racism had important consequences and implications. Our
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framework was useful for making sense of the results.
It is clear that reforms in Aboriginal affairs will require
government authorities to engage with organisations and
communities. We conclude that there are four requirements
for improved implementation success: clear recognition
of the need for change in ‘business as usual’; sustainable
commitment and authorisation; the building of alternative
structures and methods to enable effective power sharing
(consistent with the requirements of parliamentary democ-
racy); and addressing the impact of systemic racism on
decision-making, relationships, and risk management.
K E Y W O R D S
Aboriginal health, implementation failure, institutionalism, primary
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1 INTRODUCTION
Implementation of public policies and programs in Australian Aboriginal affairs is famously challeng-
ing, and instances of failure abound (see, e.g. the historical analysis of Aboriginal policy conducted by
the Northern Territory Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children; Common-
wealth of Australia, 2017). Despite repeated calls for a different way of working together (Banks, 2009,
pp. 14–15; Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, pp. 250–256; Department of Finance and Deregulation,
2010, p. 13), it seems that most reform attempts fall foul of the ‘business as usual’ problem.
There seems to be a repeating pattern of persistence with business as usual, with governments
setting program goals and priorities in capital cities, followed by failures of engagement and/or
relevance at local and regional levels, leading to poor program outcomes. In this corrosive process,
community representatives and organisations see lack of commitment and respect, whereas bureau-
crats and politicians see a different and more frustrating kind of implementation challenge than they
encounter working with and through the mainstream community. There is a sense of circularity in
cause and effect, which can be simply expressed in these terms: the lack of [political] [bureaucratic]
[professional] commitment makes it hard to get anything done properly; and because it is hard to get
anything done, there is a lack of commitment.
In this paper, we report an attempt in the primary health care (PHC) field to get beneath this conun-
drum. Specifically, we sought to understand why and how there is both a lack of commitment and a fail-
ure to accept that working with Aboriginal community representatives and organisations cannot be the
same as contracting with mainstream NGOs for the delivery of services. This is an important goal pre-
cisely because failure is so frequent in spite of genuine attempts and agreements to do things differently.
We suggest that an institutionalist analysis, which emphasises established formal and informal
patterns of interaction, provides a useful way to understand the mismatches in institutional settings and
habits (as between government officers and authorities on the one hand, and Aboriginal communities
and organisations on the other), and thus to identify some of the main requirements for success in the
reform process itself.
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2 CONTEXT
PHC policy and practice is one of the most successful areas of Aboriginal affairs. Long-standing
policy commitments by Australian governments (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013; National Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council, 2003) have been enacted in continuing investment
in Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations (ACCHOs), inter alia. But attempts to
consolidate that commitment and develop a comprehensive nation-wide system of PHC for Aboriginal
people centred on the ACCHO sector have repeatedly stalled. Centrally driven vertical programs and
the use of competitive tendering have been preferred by the Commonwealth government (Dwyer,
Lavoie, O’Donnell, Marlina, & Sullivan, 2011; Moran, Porter, & Curth-Ribb, 2014). Jurisdictional
governments, which carry primary responsibility for the public health care system, seem unable to
implement the needed structural reform in service systems (in this case, the transfer of appropriate
PHC delivery from government health authorities to the ACCHO sector).
The sector provides effective PHC (Mackay, Boxall, & Partel, 2014; Thompson et al., 2013) to a
significant proportion of the Aboriginal population in Australia (Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare, 2016, p. 7; National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009, p. 87), and functions
as an important part of the health system, working with mainstream healthcare providers. In some
communities, they remain the only PHC provider available. In others, they are alternatives to main-
stream services and preferred for their ability to provide culturally safe care and to advocate on behalf
of patients within mainstream services (Gomersall et al., 2017). Relationships between the sector and
governments are of long standing and relatively robust. There are many strengths to build on.
These achievements have been made in the context of widespread systemic racism towards
Aboriginal people (Durey, Thompson, & Wood, 2012), and the unfinished business of coming to
terms with dispossession and colonisation (Sullivan, 2011). In the absence of constitutional reform,
public administration becomes the conduit and interface through which Aboriginal self-determination
and decision-making in the policy process must occur (Davis, 2018). For policies and programs to be
implemented with Aboriginal communities, decision-making and governance need to be understood
with reference to dispossession, the ongoing process of colonisation (Davis, 2007; Sullivan, 2011),
and the need for some form of constitutional reform and inclusion (Referendum Council, 2017). These
underlying factors contribute to the apparent inability of public administrators to engage effectively
with Aboriginal communities despite consistent acknowledgement of the need to do so.
The fundamental challenges that governments and communities face in finding effective ways to
develop and implement mutually acceptable policies and programs in most fields also hold in PHC.
For some years, governments and the sector have seemed to be stuck in an ambivalent stasis. The
parties have different institutional settings and norms but need to work together in their respective
roles as funder and provider of essential PHC. There is enduring high policy support for the sector,
and fairly stable funding arrangements, developed through decades of both strong advocacy and
collaboration. But PHC coverage is patchy, with some communities seriously under-served and
without reasonable access to care when they need it (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2015).
Governments are neither enabling growth nor finding effective alternative ways to deliver essential
PHC for communities, although there have been some attempts to bypass the sector, by moving funds
to other non-government or private sector providers, in recent years (Henderson, 2015). Government
reluctance to enable the growth of the sector in order to achieve better coverage has a direct impact
on health outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who lack the ready access to
essential PHC generally available in Australia.
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T A B L E 1 Major elements of the Pathways reform plan: Increased community control of PHC
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Contractual accountability
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Risk Health authority risk
management framework
dominates, focused on risk to
government
Risk responsibility shared;
risks to community health
and ACCHOs more in scope




Funds pooled and number of
contracts reduced; shared
decision-making at regional
level for funding local
priorities
Abbreviations: ACCHO, Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation; PHC, primary health care.
This paper analyses an attempt to change the relationship between Australian government health
authorities in the Northern Territory and the ACCHO sector. The intent was to move away from
treating the ACCHO sector as just another service provider to be funded in order to deliver services
as determined by governments. The agreements articulated in Pathways to Community Control
(Northern Territory Aboriginal Health Forum, 2009) (henceforth: Pathways) committed both levels
of government and the sector (representing the health interests of Aboriginal communities) to
implementing some fundamental shifts in authority, roles, relationships, funding, and accountability
that would enable more community control over PHC governance and service delivery.
The planned changes, summarised in Table 1, had the potential to demonstrate a different way of
doing business for both governments and the sector. They envisaged a transfer of responsibility for
PHC delivery in Aboriginal communities from the NT health authority to regional community-owned
organisations. There was to be a continuing strong role for the tri-partite NT Aboriginal Health Forum
(henceforth ‘Forum’), through which both national and NT government health authorities and the
peak body for the sector, the Aboriginal Medical Services Association NT (AMSANT), negotiated
continuing development and policy for Aboriginal PHC and for the sector.
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T A B L E 2 Major elements of the Pathways reform: intended process of implementation
Element Forum roles ACCHO sector roles Government roles










































Abbreviations: ACCHO, Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation; AMSANT, Aboriginal Medical Services Association
NT.
These planned changes represented a shift to community control of PHC delivery, and network
governance (Osborne, 2010) of the PHC system. That is although the governance of ACCHOs
remains under community control, the broader PHC system needs to be planned, coordinated, and
held accountable as a network among government and non-government bodies, including ACCHOs.
Pathways expressed the directions and scope of reforms at a high level, and work commenced
immediately after its release to develop more detailed plans for implementation. Table 2 summarises
the main elements of the reform processes, with the location of primary responsibility for the work
program for each element highlighted by shading.
Significant investments were made in developing detailed plans and proposals, and in shared
governance of the reform process, but implementation was mostly unsuccessful, with one clinic being
transferred during the period of the study, and no regional proposals being accepted by government
health authorities.
Having observed and analysed the reform program at both jurisdictional and regional level, we then
sought to make sense of what happened using an institutionalist lens.
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Our starting point is that the institutional shift envisaged in Pathways entails a transformation from
New Public Management (NPM) hierarchical governance, exemplified in the centrally driven approach
to classical contracting for service delivery and accountability, to a form of network governance
of Indigenous health services in the Northern Territory. We regard this as fundamentally a task of
institutional change, and draw on institutionalist and public management literature to identify the
specific conditions that are required for such change to occur.
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3.1 Institutionalist theories
Under the broad banner of ‘new public governance’, many scholars have argued for a change from
practices shaped by NPM to more collaborative, networked institutions of governance, particularly
in domains of publicly funded social services (Osborne, 2010, Van Dooren & Hoffman, 2018). This
argument has been echoed and amplified in work on governance of Indigenous services, by the present
authors and others (Moran & Porter, 2014). Pathologies of NPM-inspired, ‘classical’ contracting
include fragmentation of service delivery, high transaction costs for contracting and accountability
processes, and the hard-wiring of low-trust relationships between funders and providers, and between
competing providers (Dwyer, Boulton, Lavoie, Tenbensel, & Cumming, 2014; Lavoie, Boulton, &
Dwyer, 2010; Smith & Smyth, 2010; Tenbensel, Dwyer, & Lavoie, 2014).
However, such institutional change is profoundly challenging for a number of reasons. Firstly, in
Parliamentary democracies such as Australia, although network governance may have advantages
for the practical management and effectiveness of complex service systems, such arrangements can
never completely replace traditional Westminster frameworks of accountability. So the question of
compatibility between hierarchical and network governance becomes central. As Klijn and Skelcher
(2007) have argued, network governance may not fit neatly with pre-existing hierarchical forms. If
the boundaries are not clear, or the incompatibilities serious, there are likely to be significant tensions
between network and hierarchical governance.
Secondly, a significant amount of ‘institutional work’ is required to design and test changes
such as this. As Richard Shaw (2013) argues, the implications for institutional design have been
underestimated in NPG/public value literature, and new forms need to be imagined and built. Shaw
suggests the following prescription, which fits with many elements of the proposed NT arrangements:
…combining policy and delivery responsibilities in nondepartmental organizations
which are closer to the communities they serve. Such public entities would be opera-
tionally autonomous from the political centre (but held accountable through, say, a fully
or partially politically appointed board), and thus more flexible, nimble and responsive
to local aspirations than central departments are considered to be (Shaw, 2013, p. 488).
Shaw and others (Cloutier, Denis, Langley, & Lamothe, 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)
also argue that the required institutional work involves tackling many issues of authorisation and
accountability.
Next, we turn specifically to institutionalist literature to explore where the energy required for such
change emanates from. As a broad approach, institutionalism focuses on the formal and informal rules
of interaction that develop as ingrained habits as much as, or more than, the product of ‘conscious’
design. March and Olsen define institutions as
the enduring collection(s) of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of
meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of individual turnover
and changing external circumstances (March & Olsen, 1989).
Their definition emphasises the ‘stickiness’ of institutions (Pierson, 2000). However, since around
2000, there has been a marked turn within institutionalist literature to understanding processes of
institutional change (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Although it used to be commonplace
to argue that institutional change occurs predominantly due to exogenous shocks, there is now
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considerable attention given to processes of endogenous change – where the energy for change comes
from within (Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue, & Hinings, 2017).
One prominent author (Crouch, 2005) has theorised the nature of endogenous institutional change,
making two crucial contributions. Firstly, he treats modes of governance (hierarchies, markets,
networks, etc.) as combinations of more fine-grained institutional characteristics. Any change from
hierarchical to network governance, therefore, requires multiple significant changes of habitual
practice, of which three are particularly important:
(i) From ‘signalling’ – where the content of behaviour that complies with institutional rules
is pre-established (given), to ‘dialogue’ which allows for negotiation and exchange through
communication.
(ii) From ‘verticality’ where communication implies a single centre of authority to ‘horizontality’
which develops rules for facilitating lateral communication.
(iii) From ‘hard enforcement’ based on formal compliance mechanisms (e.g. contractual penalties) to
‘soft enforcement’ in which mutual obligations within the service system discipline the behaviour
of the parties. (Crouch characterises this contrast in terms of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ enforcement,
but in many service systems the weakness of market forces, and the interdependence and cultural
strength of some networks make that distinction unreliable).
Crouch’s second contribution is the idea that the seeds of institutional change need to come from
within (as well as without). That is to say, within any regime dominated by particular institutional
routines (e.g. hierarchy), there will be actors (institutional entrepreneurs) who will have developed
alternative practices (e.g. network). These alternative and subordinate practices may eventually
supplant or transform dominant institutions, particularly when coupled with external shocks, and/or
with a realisation that existing institutional practices are sub-optimal or counter-productive. Crouch’s
framework has been successfully tested for its applicability to reforms in PHC (Tenbensel, 2018).
3.2 Systemic racism
In the administration of Aboriginal health policy and programs, systemic racism is an important char-
acteristic of institutions. Systemic (or institutional) racism, as opposed to interpersonal racism, is the
built-in kind of discrimination that functions without individual actors in the system having to do
anything other than the normal (Jones, 2003). To put it more formally, institutional racism is ‘those
established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce racial inequalities…if
racist consequences accrue…the institution is racist’ (Jones, 1996, p. 438) whether or not individuals
have racist intentions. There is good evidence of systemic racism in Australian health care, as seen in
differential access and outcomes for Aboriginal patients (reviewed in Bourke, Marrie, & Marrie, 2018).
In the U.S. institutionalist literature, systemic racism has been explored by authors such as Sheingate
(2014), who has argued that meso-level policy and administrative settings in the U.S. welfare system
embody practices of ‘neoliberal paternalism’ that have clear racialised implications in jurisdictions
with higher concentrations of African-American citizens. In the Australian context, this is perhaps best
exemplified in the way public administration of Aboriginal affairs relies on centrally defined, tightly
targeted programs and contracts that seem to multiply at the community level. Moran (2018) cites the
example of a community in Western Australia where there were 90 services, programs, or projects in
operation for a population of 360 people. The goals, scope, and methods to be used in these (mostly)
government-funded interventions are almost all defined in distant capital cities. Local communities
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are likely to remain without any effective power in shaping this picture, and unsurprisingly, are mostly
disengaged.
The program and contracting approach also contribute to the related problem of excessive use of
red tape and compliance requirements. This model of contracting with Aboriginal organisations –
while familiar to other non-government service providers – is based on specific perceptions of risk
in funding Aboriginal organisations, which are assumed to lack governance strength and operational
capacity. This pattern of administration meets the definition of systemic racism, as it has a differential
application and impact in Aboriginal communities and organisations.
We suggest that there is a kind of ‘elective affinity’ (McKinnon, 2010) between NPM-based
approaches to contracting with the ACCHO sector and the systemic racism of Australian society.
Meanwhile the alternative framework that inspires and guides the Aboriginal health sector, including
its focus on self-determination, inevitably conflicts with the mainstream NPM-inspired thinking and
practices of public administration. The general lack of mutual trust (Reconciliation Australia, 2017,
pp. 10–12) or shared sense of purpose is reinforced, and in turn there is a negative effect on the
development and implementation of policy improvements and on working relationships. This is truly
a wicked policy problem (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1995), and these well-known factors drag on both
meaningful cross-cultural engagement and implementation success.
3.3 Requirements for successful reform in this context
From this discussion, we can identify four key conditions necessary for the type and scale of institu-
tional change implicit in Pathways. Firstly, following Crouch, institutional change requires recognition
‘from within’ of weaknesses and problematic aspects of the dominant governance arrangements. This
means that policy actors within government need to see that things need to change.
Secondly, the seeds of institutional change need to have already developed as alternative practices
that find a niche within dominant institutions and serve as a template for institutional change from
within. Thirdly, institutional change of this nature inevitably requires continuity of political authori-
sation from ministers and senior public officials. Because of the time required to redesign institutions,
and the likelihood of turnover in political and senior management leadership, sustained political
authorisation is challenging to achieve and maintain, and may require the setting up of alternative
structures designed for this purpose, as suggested by Shaw (2013).
Fourth, measures are required to counteract the pervasive undermining effect of systemic racism. It
needs to be acknowledged and addressed, and its impacts on working relationships within deliberative
and coordinating structures need to be managed.
4 METHODS
With our industry partners, our team documented the Pathways reform attempts in the Northern
Territory using two nested case studies, one at jurisdiction level (Devitt, Dwyer, Martini, & Tilton,
2015) and the other at the level of a region (East Arnhem) (Myott, Martini, & Dwyer, 2015).
We entered into an agreement with Forum, representing both levels of government and the ACCHO
sector in the NT. We observed the processes of the reforms over 3 years (2011–2014), analysing
minutes of meetings of Forum and its various working groups, as well as policy and other working
documents. We conducted formal interviews with 28 stakeholders and participated in meetings and
other informal discussions. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analysed thematically. Text
was initially coded using categories based on the major elements of the reforms and refined during
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the analysis using an inductive approach. The case study methods and results are reported in more
detail in the original case study reports (Dwyer et al., 2015).
In this paper, we have conducted a secondary analysis of the Pathways case studies, using the
analytical framework described above. We synthesised and interpreted the results in order to answer
these questions: To what extent does our framework explain implementation failure? And could this
framework be used as guidance for improving the success of reforms that require governments to
work with Aboriginal organisations and communities?
5 RESULTS: THE PLAN, AND WHAT HAPPENED
Pathways (2009) was endorsed by all three parties after many years of negotiation. It laid out a
plan for transferring government-run clinics in Aboriginal communities across the NT to regional
community governance, along a continuum of increasing levels of community control according to
community readiness or capacity. The fact that Forum members were successful in this negotiation
was an achievement in itself, building on Forum’s track record of success in improving and expanding
PHC in NT Aboriginal communities. Over many years, the partners had developed a rational planning
and evidence-based approach, and a strong capacity to work together and to try new ways of doing
things (Allen and Clarke, 2011; Devitt et al., 2015).
There was a trade-off at the heart of this plan – in return for community control, communities
would be required to develop PHC at a regional rather than discrete community level (there were
planned to be about 14 regions). For communities, regionalisation brought the requirement to work
across language and cultural differences, as well as sizeable areas. For some ACCHOs, it would mean
trading local independence for more stable funding and expanded roles.
The advantage for government was that this reduced the potential number of governing bodies
that would need to be established and then demonstrate capacity, and then be funded and held
accountable. However, government health departments would be required to meet the challenge
of working differently with the sector, both in PHC delivery and in overall planning and resource
allocation (including through bundled regional allocation of funding, and funds pooling across vertical
programs). That is health authorities would be required to move from a relationship based, at least
formally, in arms-length contracts for discrete packages of centrally defined activities, to working
with Aboriginal community organisations as providers of essential care for regions. This implied
some power sharing – for example health authorities would have reduced power to unilaterally shift
resources between vertical programs. For the NT government, there was another major challenge
arising from the requirement to transfer existing services, clinic staff, and resources.
Importantly for all parties, regionalisation would enable some small clinics and organisations
to achieve the critical mass needed for effective PHC delivery, and the new arrangements would
enhance the capacity of the service system to allocate resources to high priority health problems and
opportunities at local and regional levels.
The Pathways document focused strongly at the community and service delivery level – that is on
the question of how is this going to work in practice? It paid little attention to the necessary changes
in funding, regulation, the role of NT Health, and overall governance of the PHC system in the NT (J
Moffet, CEO of NT Health, personal communication 12 February 2013).
Work began in 2010. A central planning unit was funded and established within AMSANT, and a
tri-partite committee reporting to Forum took responsibility for the planning phase. Regional steering
committees were established in four regions, charged with developing plans for the transfer of service
delivery and for demonstrating community capability. Forum’s attempts to address some of the
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system (as opposed to service delivery) requirements were largely unsuccessful, as both government
departments took a ‘wait and see’ approach. For example no technical work was undertaken on the
parameters and methods of funds pooling.
The deadline for submission of regional proposals was 30 June 2012, and in our second case study,
the East Arnhem Steering Committee met this timeline. A great deal of development, consultation
(Christie, Greatorex, van Weeren, & Cathcart, 2011), and planning had been done, in a fertile field
because the communities of this region had previously determined that regional development in all
fields of activity was their goal (Miwatj Health, 2013).
But by July 2012, there had been a change of government in the NT and of government leadership
in the Commonwealth, and a major mainstream health system reform process (Council of Australian
Governments, 2011) had resulted in the loss of key senior public servants who were members of
Forum. Momentum for the Pathways reforms was steadily disappearing. In response to the East
Arnhem regional plan, requests for changes were made by senior government officers, changes that
would have undone carefully negotiated arrangements between local agencies and communities, and
that were not essential to meeting the policy and operational requirements of the Pathways reform.
Further correspondence was entered into, meetings were held, Ministerial promises were made,
and one NT government clinic was actually transferred. But in the end, no final response to the
regionalisation proposal was ever made by governments. The situation in other regions was different,
but the outcome was largely the same – no regional proposals were accepted, and the goal of
transferring responsibility for the governance and management of PHC for Aboriginal people in the
NT to communities and ACCHOs, with all of the system and funding changes such a transfer would
require, was not achieved. Rather, the Pathways project experienced a largely unexplained passage
into neglect and inaction that seems to be typical when endorsed policies or programs can neither be
successfully completed nor publicly acknowledged to have failed.
Activity has in fact continued at both regional and jurisdictional levels, due to efforts by the sector
and the NT health department (Cork-King, personal communication 8 December 2017). In East Arn-
hem, further clinic-by-clinic transfers have happened (Miwatj Health, 2018). But the Pathways attempt
at a systematic policy-driven process of transfer ended with a whimper. Although there was some
regional progress (as evidenced by the East Arnhem proposal), virtually no progress had been made
at any stage on planning or developing the system-level public administration elements of reform.
6 ANALYSIS
The case studies demonstrate the extreme difficulty for public administrators to find feasible ways
to move from a relationship formally defined and operated as funder-to-contractor, towards one of
networked arrangements where the separate organisations shared some power and decision-making
for the regional care system as well as for jurisdiction-level coordination and governance tasks.
We suggest that these case studies are not just another sad story of poor execution leading to
implementation failure. Rather they exemplify a widely acknowledged pattern in Aboriginal affairs
(see, e.g. Banks, 2009) that has deeper roots and needs to be understood as an institutional feature of
Australian public administration.
Applying the four required conditions of our institutionalist theoretical framework to the Pathways
reform attempt, we found some features that met the requirements for establishing a new institutional
fit and initially facilitated progress, but were not sustained, and others that were not present or
attempted. They are strong initial recognition of the need for change, founded on many years of policy
work and relationship building; the seeds of change in the form of alternative practices; and a notable
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T A B L E 3 Conditions for institutional change and the Pathways experience
Condition for institutional change Pathways experience
Recognition ‘from within’ of weaknesses and
problematic aspects of the dominant governance
arrangements.
Strong recognition by senior public servants and
ACCHO leaders of the need for change to
improve health care delivery, and supportive
policy was in place.
Seeds of institutional change already developed as
alternative practices that find a niche within
dominant institutions and serve as a template for
institutional change from within.
Forum had a strong track record in collaborative
planning and policy development that had
enabled success in previous projects.
Continuity of political authorisation from ministers
and senior public officials. Due to long
timelines, may require alternative structures for
the purpose.
Political authorisation secured but lost in changes
of elected governments and high turnover of
senior public servants. Forum constituted as
deliberative not operational/coordinating body
and no alternative was developed.
Measures to counteract the pervasive undermining
impacts of institutional racism on working
relationships need to be embedded.
Institutional racism recognised on all sides but not
addressed in management or deliberative
settings. Perception of high risk to government
and to careers of senior personnel was a barrier.
Community leaders felt that their tasks, and
contributions, were undervalued.
absence of sustained political/bureaucratic authorisation. Interacting with all of these, systemic racism
had important consequences and implications. These features are mapped to the theoretical framework
in Table 3 and discussed below.
6.1 Recognition of the need for change
Forum representatives recognised that existing arrangements were not consistent with established
policy nor with enabling the health gain that effective PHC can offer to Aboriginal communities, and
together they created the opportunity that was crystallised in the commitment to Pathways. However,
government recognition of the need for change, and its necessary extent, appears to have been limited
to a particular group of senior public servants experienced in Aboriginal health in the NT. This fragile
foundation was undermined when high staff turnover, brought on by broader national health system
reforms commencing in 2011, removed key members of this group. The required recognition, and
commitment to the pursuit of change, were not sustained.
6.2 Alternative practices seeded, but failed to thrive
For any network governance approach to be workable for governments, suitable public administration
modalities are required in order to enact the required switches. Firstly, these are from signalling and
vertical communication to dialogue and horizontal communication (as is implied in the over-used
notion of ‘partnership’ and as required for the functioning of networks). For example centrally defined
program and contracting approaches are perhaps the most important enactment of signalling and
vertical communication in this context. Neither are likely to be abandoned by governments, but rather
a shift from multiple ‘vertical program’ contracts to fewer, integrated contracts, supplemented by net-
working arrangements, is needed. The third is to shift towards ‘soft’ enforcement (although contractual
and network accountabilities would likely co-exist). This is in itself difficult but not impossible, and
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governments routinely use dialogue and horizontal communication in some contexts, not generally
including Aboriginal affairs (e.g. in relations between public hospital boards and health ministers).
Forum played the critical role in designing, initiating, and seeking to implement the planned
reforms. It provided a space in which the actors could develop methods of governance that had net-
work characteristics – that is participants had already established a niche in which they had the capacity
to ‘switch’ to practices of horizontal communication, dialogue, and the use of persuasion rather than
the hard threat of enforcement. Forum had thus proven its ability to negotiate some successful changes
to funding and governance (such as through the Primary Health Care Access Program; Rosewarne &
Boffa, 2004). This did, for a time at least, come close to what Crouch (2005) suggests is required as an
endogenous force for institutional change within the dominant institutions. In the event, this force was
not effectively maintained for long enough and may have been insufficient to weather the inevitable
setbacks experienced in any implementation process, particularly in the context of Aboriginal affairs.
6.3 Need for sustained authorisation and alternative structures
There were initial and continuing problems with authorisation, in spite of dual ministerial sign-off
on the Pathways document. This high-level commitment was not matched with secure structures
and processes for authorising the needed changes. The allocation of implementation responsibility
to Forum was well-intentioned (including for sharing power) but the required operational authority
for this otherwise deliberative body was not negotiated. Forum members were not empowered to
make decisions that would be binding on all parties, and Forum was thus unable to act effectively
to maintain momentum and resolve problems in the implementation process. Although Forum
served well as the site for the development of alternative practices, it was not suitably configured to
function as an alternative ongoing governance structure for implementation. The failure to provide for
implementation capability in this way was a critical contribution to project failure and is sometimes
described as the classic approach to transfer: ‘chucking it over the fence’ without thinking through the
authority and implementation structures required.
The more difficult and technical requirement was to reconcile network governance with hierarchical
authority in the context of parliamentary democracy and electoral accountability (Klijn & Skelcher,
2007).
The development of such arrangements is a central dilemma for governments and Aboriginal polities
in the attempt to negotiate and enact policies and programs that are mutually acceptable and more effec-
tive. The possibility for regional boards to fulfil a regional network governance function was contem-
plated in Pathways (and precursors were established in the form of regional clinical networks). But the
potential for Forum (with appropriate changes to role, membership and structure) or an alternative body
to take on a jurisdiction-level network governance function for the PHC system was not explicitly con-
templated or discussed. The absence of active work within the Commonwealth and NT health author-
ities on required changes in their administrative arrangements to enable implementation of Pathways
(such as the development of regional funding methods) was also a clear indication of failure to engage
with the development of alternative institutional forms and practices at system (or jurisdictional) level.
Thus, the work on Pathways did not ever reach the point of contemplating the question of arrange-
ments to ensure that a network governance body could operate separate from the major government
agencies, while also ensuring appropriate authorisation and accountability, as suggested by Klijn
and Skelcher (2007) and Shaw (2013). Proposals for such a body at the national level, made by the
sector and by the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (National Health and Hospitals
Reform Commission, 2009, pp. 73–74), did not gain traction with Commonwealth health officials.
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The impact of changes of government following both national and NT elections, and the absence
of funding in the 2014–2015 financial year, also contributed to bringing engagement in Pathways to
an inconclusive end.
6.4 Systemic racism: Barrier to power sharing and reform
Working across cultures and in partnerships is normally difficult and was inescapable in the Pathways
reform project. The difficulty can be attributed to a combination of the underlying power imbalance
between Aboriginal communities and government authorities, the participants’ separate interests
as funders and providers, and the pervasive and perverse impacts of systemic racism. Interpersonal
racism was not reported, but systemic racism was considered by many case study participants (both
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) to be an important underlying influence. Finding good ways to work
across race and cultures in this context remains a significant outstanding challenge, in spite of the fact
that there was much experience and good will among some of the people involved.
There was a perception that governments did not acknowledge the effectiveness and cultural
legitimacy of ACCHOs, or their proper role in shaping the dialogue about community control of the
health sector. Although engagement between governments and the ACCHO sector was an essential
requirement, there was a mutual perception of failure to maintain commitments and a sense of
significant wear and tear on established relationships and mutual trust.
Many of the strengths of the community leaders and representatives, as well as the challenges they
faced, were deeply shaped by traditional and contemporary Aboriginal cultures. These aspects, in the
wake of the Commonwealth government’s Intervention in Aboriginal communities (Evans, 2012), were
seen by community stakeholders to have been misunderstood and their significance underestimated.
Risks and other problems that might have been seen as solvable in other contexts became insoluble,
resulting in loss of momentum for reform. The perception by some public administrators that
governance of Aboriginal organisations is less robust, and that being a champion of reform in this
context is a career risk, was evident in the case studies. However, we found no evidence of any formal
acknowledgement or discussion of systemic racism or how to counteract it.
We suggest that this difficult situation is made worse by the use of classical contracting by both lev-
els of government. The very contractual instruments that are used to reduce perceived risk undermine
the development of robust and responsive PHC programs, give rise to compliance problems, impede
the development of strong organisations, and assume a lack of trust (Smith & Smyth, 2010). Change
will require not only measures that address the sense of high risk for funders (such as committed
political leadership) but also attention to the impact of systemic racism on working relationships.
Finding a way out of this conundrum is an outstanding challenge for Australian public administration
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), although it has been done in both Canada and the United States
(Gottlieb, 2013; O’Neil et al., 2016).
7 CONCLUSION
The need for effective engagement with Aboriginal communities and organisations is well recognised
by political leaders and in public policy, and it is acknowledged as being essential for success across
all responsible portfolios. The case studies indicate a deep seated incapacity to do so within the current
system, given both the unresolved ongoing processes of colonisation and systemic racism, and the
limitations of the favoured modalities of contracts and programs. This implementation problem is well
known, and we suggest that consistently turning a blind eye to it is itself a manifestation of systemic
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racism. For public administrators, the task of finding effective, feasible, and acceptable methods for
conducting public policy/program development and implementation in ways that address this problem
is an outstanding challenge.
Our analytical framework allowed us to develop a deeper explanation of the forces and circum-
stances that contributed to failure of the intended Pathways reforms, in ways that are informed by
the institutional constraints faced by public administrators, and go beyond the usual exhortations to
try harder. We suggest that these insights could be developed for use as criteria for designing future
reforms in Aboriginal affairs. That is, at the inception when reform projects are being negotiated and
designed, proponents should attend to ensuring:
1. That there is recognition of the need for change within government not only at the political level, but
also among the senior public servants who are tasked with leading reform efforts for government.
2. That opportunities for the early development of alternative practices are built into the negotiation
and planning of reforms, building on any existing niches of endogenous institutional change.
3. That in the process of reform, sustainable or locked-in authorisation is secured, so that adequate
time and resources are reliably available, and so that commitment can be sustained for long enough
to enable reform goals to be implemented and their impact evaluated. Attention and resources
also need to be directed to the development of more permanent alternative institutional forms
that enable power sharing and network governance of service systems. This may require different
degrees of separation from the business-as-usual of government departments, in the form of a
purpose-designed authority or commission.
4. That the challenges of creating effective mechanisms and processes for use by Indigenous organi-
sations/communities and government authorities in working together are acknowledged openly and
addressed. In order to counter the impacts of systemic racism and ongoing colonisation, attention is
required to power imbalances, to the development and maintenance of trust and to the management
of perceptions of risk.
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